![]() Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13: An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). ![]() ![]() Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “” key, allowing VNC access via the “” key, and more. This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the “” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some debug functions. ![]() If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. ![]()
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